In the sphere of July 2014, FireEye cell security researchers tolerate bare with the aim of an iOS app installed using enterprise/ad-hoc provisioning may well restore an extra legitimate app installed through the App deposit, while prolonged while both apps used the same bundle identifier. This in-house app may well spectacle an arbitrary title (like “New Flappy Bird”) with the aim of lures the user to install it, but the app can restore an extra legitimate app with installation. All apps can befall replaced excluding iOS preinstalled apps, such while cell search. This vulnerability exists for the reason that iOS doesn't enforce matching certificates pro apps with the same bundle identifier. We verified this vulnerability on iOS 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1 and 8.1.1 beta, pro both jailbroken and non-jailbroken policy. An assailant can influence this vulnerability both through wireless networks and USB. We named this attack “Masque Attack" .
We tolerate notified Apple in relation to this vulnerability on July 26. Recently Claud Xiao bare the “WireLurker” malware. With looking into WireLurker, we found with the aim of it on track to make the most of a some degree of form of Masque Attacks to attack iOS policy through USB. Masque Attacks can pose much better threats than WireLurker. Masque Attacks can restore authentic apps,such while banking and email apps, using attacker's malware through the Internet. With the aim of income the assailant can move quietly user's banking credentials by replacing an authentic banking app with an malware with the aim of has identical UI. Surprisingly, the malware can even access the creative app's confined data, which wasn't distant whilst the creative app was replaced. These data may well contain cached emails, or else even login-tokens which the malware can enjoy to log into the user's explanation frankly.
We tolerate seen proofs with the aim of this back copy on track to circulate. In the sphere of this job, we consider it urgent to give permission the open know, since near may well befall existing attacks with the aim of haven’t been found by security vendors. We are besides sharing improvement measures to help iOS users better watch over themselves.
Security Impacts
By leveraging Masque Attack, an assailant can lure a victim to install an app with a illusory title crafted by the assailant (like “New Angry Bird”), and the iOS coordination resolve enjoy it to restore a legitimate app with the same bundle identifier. Masque Attack couldn't restore Apple's own platform apps such while cell search, but it can restore apps installed from app deposit. Masque Attack has brutal security penalty:
Attackers may well mimic the creative app’s login interface to move quietly the victim’s login credentials. We tolerate long-established this through multiple email and banking apps, someplace the malware uses a UI identical to the creative app to trick the user into entering real login credentials and upload them to a remote head waiter.
We besides found with the aim of data under the creative app’s directory, such while confined data caches, remained in the sphere of the malware confined directory with the creative app was replaced. The malware can move quietly these delicate data. We tolerate long-established this attack with email apps someplace the malware can move quietly confined caches of valuable emails and upload them to remote head waiter.
The MDM interface couldn’t distinguish the malware from the creative app, for the reason that they used the same bundle identifier. At present near is rebuff MDM API to step the certificate in a row pro both app. As a consequence, it is hard pro MDM to detect such attacks.
While mentioned in the sphere of our Virus Bulletin 2014 paper “Apple with no a shell - iOS under under attack attack”, apps disseminated using venture provisioning profiles (which we call “EnPublic apps”) aren’t subjected to Apple’s periodical process. Therefore, the assailant can influence iOS exclusive APIs pro powerful attacks such while background monitoring (CVE-2014-1276) and mimic iCloud’s UI to move quietly the user’s Apple ID and password.
The assailant can besides enjoy Masque Attacks to bypass the regular app sandbox and at that time step core privileges by attacking accepted iOS vulnerabilities, such while the ones used by the Pangu team.
An instance
In the sphere of single of our experiments, we used an in-house app with a bundle identifier “com.Google.Gmail” with a title “New Flappy Bird”. We signed this app using an venture certificate. Whilst we installed this app from a website, it replaced the creative Gmail app on the phone.
Play a part 1 illustrates this process. Play a part 1(a) (b) prove the legitimate Gmail app installed on the device with 22 unread emails. Play a part 1(c) shows with the aim of the victim was lured to install an in-house app called “New Flappy Bird” from a website. Take note of with the aim of “New Flappy Bird” is the title pro this app and the assailant can arrangement it to an arbitrary price whilst preparing this app. However, this app has a bundle identifier “com.Google.Gmail”.
With the victim clicks “Install”, play a part 1(d) shows the in-house app was replacing the creative Gmail app in the installation. Play a part 1(e) shows with the aim of the creative Gmail app was replaced by the in-house app. With installation, whilst opening the inexperienced “Gmail” app, the user resolve befall unconsciously logged in the sphere of with almost the same UI excluding pro a lesser text box by the side of the top aphorism “yes, you are pwned” which we designed to simply illustrate the attack. Attackers won’t prove such courtesy in the sphere of real humankind attacks. Meanwhile, the creative authentic Gmail app’s confined cached emails, which were stored while clear-text in the sphere of a sqlite3 folder while made known in the sphere of play a part 2, are uploaded to a remote head waiter.
Take note of with the aim of Masque Attack happens completely in excess of the wireless set of contacts, with no relying on linking the device to a central processing unit.
Mitigations
IOS users can watch over themselves from Masque Attacks by following three steps:
Don’t install apps from third-party sources other than Apple’s executive App deposit or else the user’s own organization
Don’t click “Install” on a pop-up from a third-party net leaf, while made known in the sphere of play a part 1(c), rebuff topic what did you say? The pop-up says in relation to the app. The pop-up can prove eye-catching app titles crafted by the assailant
Whilst opening an app, if iOS shows an alert with “Untrusted App Developer”, while made known in the sphere of play a part 3, click on “Don’t Trust” and uninstall the app without delay
To check whether near are apps already installed through Masque Attacks, iOS 7 users can check the venture provisioning profiles installed on their iOS policy, which indicate the signing identities of on the cards malware delivered by Masque Attacks, by inspection “Settings - > broad-spectrum -> Profiles” pro “PROVISIONING PROFILES”. IOS 7 users can shot suspicious provisioning profiles to their security subdivision. Deleting a provisioning profile resolve prevent venture signed apps which rely on with the aim of restricted profile from running. However, iOS 8 policy don’t prove provisioning profiles already installed on the policy and we propose taking in addition caution whilst installing apps.
We disclosed this vulnerability to Apple in the sphere of July. For the reason that all the existing standard protections or else interfaces by Apple cannot prevent such an attack, we are asking Apple to provide extra powerful interfaces to skilled security vendors to watch over venture users from these and other difficult attacks.
We thank FireEye team members Noah Johnson and Andrew Osheroff pro their help in the sphere of producing the tape capture on tape. We besides hunger to thank Kyrksen Storer and Lynn Thorne pro their help humanizing this blog. Special gratitude to Zheng Bu pro his valuable annotations and criticism.
Tags : IOS , App
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